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The Cuban Missile Crisis: Brinkmanship and Diplomacy


The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as one of the most critical moments in the history of the Cold War. Occurring in October 1962, it brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear conflict. The crisis unfolded over thirteen tense days, marked by high-stakes diplomacy, strategic brinkmanship, and the specter of mutually assured destruction. Examining the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis reveals the delicate balance between assertive foreign policy and the imperative of diplomatic resolution.

Background:

The origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be traced back to the escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II. The Cold War rivalry led to a series of proxy conflicts and geopolitical maneuvering as each superpower sought to expand its sphere of influence. Cuba, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, emerged as a focal point in this struggle, with the Soviet Union providing military and economic support to the communist regime.

The Crisis Unfolds:

The crisis reached a boiling point in October 1962 when American U-2 reconnaissance planes discovered evidence of Soviet ballistic missile installations in Cuba. President John F. Kennedy’s administration faced a daunting challenge: how to respond to this provocative act without triggering a full-scale nuclear confrontation. Kennedy and his advisors deliberated over a range of options, including military strikes, naval blockade, and diplomatic negotiations.

Brinkmanship:

Brinkmanship, the practice of pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster in order to achieve a favorable outcome, defined much of the American response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy’s decision to impose a naval blockade, or “quarantine,” around Cuba was a calculated move designed to demonstrate resolve while avoiding direct military confrontation. The blockade effectively cut off the flow of Soviet arms to Cuba and signaled America’s willingness to escalate if necessary.

Diplomacy:

Simultaneously, behind-the-scenes diplomacy played a crucial role in resolving the crisis. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev engaged in a series of tense negotiations via diplomatic channels, including back-channel communications facilitated by third parties such as the United Nations and the Turkish government. These discussions offered a vital opportunity for both sides to communicate their concerns and explore potential avenues for de-escalation.

The Resolution:


Ultimately, a combination of diplomatic pressure and strategic maneuvering led to a resolution of the crisis. In a secret agreement, Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a public commitment from the United States not to invade the island and a private pledge to remove American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The crisis was averted, and both sides breathed a collective sigh of relief as the world narrowly avoided nuclear catastrophe.


The Cuban Missile Crisis left a lasting imprint on the conduct of international relations. It underscored the dangers of brinkmanship and the imperative of diplomatic engagement in resolving conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries. The crisis also highlighted the importance of clear communication, crisis management, and the pursuit of mutually beneficial solutions to global challenges.

Further readings

  1.  https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/When%20The%20Russians%20Blinked-%20The%20U_S_%20Maritime%20Response%20To%20The%20Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis.pdf [bare URL PDF]
  2. ^ Keller, Renata (3 February 2024). “The Latin American Missile Crisis”. Diplomatic History. 39 (2): 195–222. doi:10.1093/dh/dht134. JSTOR 26376653.
  3. ^ “Milestones: 1961–1968 – The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962”. history.state.gov. Archived from the original on 3 April 2019.
  4. ^ Dobbs, Michael (2008). One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-4000-4358-3.
  5. ^ Scott, Len; Hughes, R. Gerald (2015). The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal. Taylor & Francis. p. 17. ISBN 978-1-317-55541-4. Archived from the original on 29 July 2016. Retrieved 31 December 2015.
  6. ^ Society, National Geographic (21 April 2021). “Kennedy ‘Quarantines’ Cuba”. National Geographic Society. Retrieved 11 May 2022.
  7. ^ Jump up to:a b Jonathan, Colman (1 April 2019). “The US Legal Case for the Blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis, October–November 1962”. Journal of Cold War Studies.
  8. ^ Jump up to:a b William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (2004) p. 579.
  9. ^ Jeffery D. Shields (7 March 2016). “The Malin Notes: Glimpses Inside the Kremlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis” (PDF). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
  10. ^ The Kennedy Tapes Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Norton. 2002. p. 421. ISBN 978-0-393-32259-0.
  11. ^ “”One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964″. Journal of Cold War Studies. 2002. Retrieved 31 August 2015.
  12. ^ Jump up to:a b Yaffe, Helen (2020). We are Cuba!: How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 14–22, 176–181. ISBN 978-0-300-23003-1. For the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1950s, US imperialism was the principal explanation for the island’s structural weaknesses…Thus, the Revolution of 1959 faced two real alternatives: it could renounce all fundamental changes, beyond expelling the dictator Fulgencio Batista, so that it would be acceptable to Washington; or it could pursue the deep structural changes necessary to address the island’s socioeconomic ills and dependent development, which would bring hostility from the United States.
  13. ^ Bolender, Keith (2012). Cuba under Siege: American Policy, the Revolution, and its People. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. x, 14, 18–20, 45–57, 63–64, et passim. doi:10.1057/9781137275554. ISBN 978-1-137-27554-7. The economic inequality and social unrest was brought to a head under the brutal Batista dictatorship, supported by American arms, money, and authority. An estimated 20,000 were killed opposing the government from 1955 to his overthrow, with even President John F. Kennedy using this figure in a rare expression of sympathy for revolutionary goals. Kennedy also came closest to recognizing America could not claim ignorance of the harm its neocolonial control was inflicting on the inhabitants…Transformation came swiftly, completely, and often framed in direct conflict with American immoderations. Popular support for radicalization was possible only by aiming it at the social inequalities associated with foreign domination, of which the greater part of the Cuban population, particularly in the rural areas, had tired of finally. The backing of the countryside permitted Castro to act ruthlessly to ensure his revolution would not suffer the same fate as Grau’s. Concurrently, America’s hostile reaction worked in harmony, if not intentionally, with Castro’s political ambitions. He comprehended the turmoil and incongruities of American dominated prerevolution society had to end.
  14. ^ Kapstein, Ethan B. (December 2020). “Private Enterprise, International Development, and the Cold War”. Journal of Cold War Studies. 22 (4). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 113–145. doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00967.
  15. ^ Jump up to:a b Yaffe, Helen (2020). We are Cuba!: How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post-Soviet World. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 67, 176–181. ISBN 978-0-300-23003-1. What have Cuba’s revolutionary people survived? For six decades, the Caribbean island has withstood manifold and unrelenting aggression from the world’s dominant economic and political power: overt and covert military actions; sabotage and terrorism by US authorities and allied exiles…The first Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plan for paramilitary action in Cuba was developed in December 1959, less than a year after Batista fled the island and well before the US blockade was imposed. The CIA recruited operatives inside Cuba to carry out terrorism and sabotage, killing civilians and causing economic damage.
  16. ^ Piccone, Ted; Miller, Ashley (19 December 2016). Cuba, the U.S., and the Concept of Sovereignty: Toward a Common Vocabulary? (Report). Washington: Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on 7 July 2017. Retrieved 6 January 2023. President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a plan to train Cuban exiles to commit violent acts of terrorism within Cuba against civilians, and the CIA trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields…U.S. government officials justified some of the terrorist attacks on Cuban soil on the grounds of coercive regime change
  17. ^ Domínguez López, Ernesto; Yaffe, Helen (2 November 2017). “The Deep, Historical Roots of Cuban Anti-imperialism” (PDF). Third World Quarterly. 38 (11). Abingdon: Taylor & Francis: 2517–2535. doi:10.1080/01436597.2017.1374171. S2CID 149249232. In international terms, Cuba’s Revolution dented the US sphere of influence, weakening the US position as a global power. These were the structural geopolitical motivations for opposing Cuba’s hard-won independence. The Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) invasion and multiple military invasion plans, programmes of terrorism, sabotage and subversion were part of Washington’s reaction.
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  21. ^ Domínguez, Jorge I. (April 2000). “The @#$%& Missile Crisis” (PDF). Diplomatic History. 24 (2). Boston/Oxford: Blackwell Publishers/Oxford University Press: 305–316. doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00214. Archived (PDF) from the original on 7 September 2020. Retrieved 6 September 2019 – via Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. On the afternoon of 16 October… Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy convened in his office a meeting on Operation Mongoose, the code name for a U.S. policy of sabotage and related covert operation aimed at Cuba… The Kennedy administration returned to its policy of sponsoring terrorism against Cuba as the confrontation with the Soviet Union lessened… Only once in these nearly thousand pages of documentation did a US official raise something that resembled a faint moral objection to US-government sponsored terrorism.
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  25. ^ Brenner, Philip (2002). “Turning History on its Head”. National Security Archive. Washington, D.C.: George Washington University. Archived from the original on 24 August 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2020. ..in October 1962 the United States was waging a war against Cuba that involved several assassination attempts against the Cuban leader, terrorist acts against Cuban civilians, and sabotage of Cuban factories.
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  33. ^ Miller, Nicola (2002). “The Real Gap in the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Post-Cold-War Historiography and Continued Omission of Cuba”. In Carter, Dale; Clifton, Robin (eds.). War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy, 1942–62. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 211–237. ISBN 978-1-4039-1385-2. Retrieved 2 February 2020.
  34. ^ Getchell, Michelle (2018). “Operation Anadyr: Soviet Missiles in Cuba”. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 70–93. ISBN 978-1-62466-742-8. a Special National Intelligence Estimate drawn up in September had analyzed the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and concluded that its purpose was to ‘strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.’
  35. ^ CIA (19 September 1962). Smith, Louis J. (ed.). Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Military Buildup in Cuba. Foreign Relations of the United States (Report). 1961–1963. Vol. X, Cuba. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian. 85-3-62. Archived from the original on 15 October 2012. Retrieved 19 February 2020.
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  102. ^ Jump up to:a b David Von Pein’s JFK Channel (30 August 2013). “JFK TALKS WITH DWIGHT EISENHOWER ABOUT THE CUBAN CRISIS (OCTOBER 22, 1962)”. Archived from the original on 20 September 2017. Retrieved 15 September 2017 – via YouTube.
  103. ^ Jump up to:a b “1962 Year In Review: Cuban Missile Crisis”. United Press International, Inc. 1962. Archived from the original on 2 May 2010. Retrieved 22 April 2010.
  104. ^ Ted Sorensen (22 April 2007). “Great speeches of the 20th century: The Kennedys. Ted Sorenson: JFK’s inaugural address was world-changing”. The Guardian. Archived from the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 15 August 2021.

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